The making of ‘American’: race and nation in
neurasthenic discourse
BRAD CAMPBELL

This paper considers the underexamined racial and nationalistic components
of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century neurasthenic discourse to
propose that neurasthenia was as much a discourse of modern American
identity as it was a discourse of disease. By closely reading the medical and
general texts which helped to popularize it, and by scrutinizing the context of
its vogue and supposed subsequent decline, this paper shows how neurasthenia
was intimately bound up with the era’s politics of race, nationalism and
citizenship. Countering traditional understandings of the disease, this study
suggests that neurasthenia did not simply anticipate but was pre-eminently
preoccupied with the questions and crises of modernity; that it was not, after
all, a quintessentially Victorian but a fundamentally modernist discourse, and
a paradigmatic example of how the construction of a neurotic American subject
was necessarily and inevitably a construction of a modern American subject.

On or about November 1918, neurasthenia is supposed to have died. Of
course, its death had been anticipated for some time, and more than a few
observers had presaged (or at least hoped for) its demise much earlier. Charles
L. Dana, for instance, an eminent neurologist and early convert to Freudian
psychoanalysis, heralded the ‘partial passing of neurasthenia’ in his 1904
article with this title. For Dana, though, there was really nothing ‘partial’
about it. After meticulously thinning the disease’s symptom catalogue by
‘about 50%’, he proposes that ‘if one follows it up very closely we may yet
end in fi nding that there is no such thing as neurasthenia at all’ (Dana, 1904:
341). Dana’s conclusion was, for its time, perhaps too ambitious, but only
slightly premature: by 1917, Robert S. Carroll (1917: 23) could sense that
the ‘time [was] rapidly coming’ when neurasthenia would fall from its cultural
pedestal, and by 1921 Wade Wright could claim with confi dence in the pages
of Mental Hygiene that it was ‘no longer the height of good form to enjoy poor
health’ (Lutz, 2001: 51) – a subtle dig at ‘fashionable’ neurasthenics and a
telling suggestion that the era of neurasthenia had already ended.
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Modern medical historians and other scholars of the disease have generally
followed such texts when marking the historical perimeter of the malady.
In Marijke Gijswijt-Hofstra’s introduction to a brilliant collection of essays,
Cultures of Neurasthenia, she observes that ‘The First World War marked
more or less the fi nal retreat of neurasthenia’ (Gijswijt-Hofstra and Porter,
2001: 1). Scholars past and present appear to agree, noting variously that
the disease ‘had been all but forgotten’ (Gosling, 1987: 13), had ‘all but
disappeared’ (Hyman, 1998: 8) or had ‘effectively been demolished’
(Sicherman, 1977: 36) somewhere around this time. Thus, by the advent
of, or sometime during, World War I, but certainly by the end of the war,
neurasthenia – the nineteenth-century’s most fascinating and fashionable
disease, its one time preoccupation, its ‘king of neuroses’ (Beard, 1880: 26) –
had apparently breathed its last.
It is surprising, then, to fi nd that as late as the 1930s, neurasthenia was
still the topic of lively medical discussions and the cornerstone of a veritable
and vibrant nervous illness market. It was still the (not-always-celebrated)
subject of self-help books, medical and pseudo-medical treatises, novels and
memoirs; still the life-blood of the country’s various sanatoriums and health
retreats; still a lucrative source of patients for private medical practice. Indeed,
neurasthenia seems to have enjoyed a remarkable life after its supposed
death. In a 1930 article which otherwise disparages the disease as a catch-all
diagnosis for lazy doctors, A. A. Brill (1930: 124) nonetheless admits that
‘neurasthenia is still very popular with the medical profession’. In fact, his
article appeared in a special edition of the Medical Review of Reviews which
included a preface by Freud and contained a ‘Symposium on neurasthenia’.
As Dorian Feigenbaum (1930), the issue’s editor, explains, ‘The subject of
neurasthenia was chosen first, because the term is loosely used, and even
abused, in medical diagnostics, and it is time to clear up our ideas on this
subject and to come to some understanding of its meaning’. The passage
clearly anticipates Brill’s criticisms of the disease later in the symposium,
but it tells us something more important about the status of the malady long
after World War I: although certainly abused, neurasthenia was anything
but dead, nor was it the purpose of this symposium to dismantle it. On the
contrary, neurasthenia’s meaning was still being negotiated, and there was
hope, at least for Feigenbaum, that the disease, with all its singular and
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superior illustrations of the interdependence between somatic and psychic
factors, would lead to a ‘deeper understanding of the generally surmised
ultimate somatic basis of neurotic phenomena’.
On the other side of the Atlantic, and in non-medical contexts, there
were also signs that neurasthenia was alive and well. For instance, Doris
Mary Armitage (1929: 17) lamented that, at least from a British perspective,
neurasthenics were ‘unhappily an increasingly large class of sufferers’. The
steady publication of neurasthenic material in the USA and Europe would
seem to support her observations, as books and pamphlets offering general
information, advice or remedies for neurasthenia and related illnesses
continued to ‘pour off the presses’ in the 1920s (Lutz, 2001: 59). Evidently,
neurasthenia survived the war after all, and the reports of its death seem to
have been greatly exaggerated.
My purpose here, however, is not to propose my own set of dates for the
life-span of neurasthenia. I am, indeed, rather sceptical of the traditional
markers of its rise and fall, and I suspect that saying this disease died some
time around World War I – during that saturated segment of years at the
feet of which we bury so many modes and movements – is largely a matter
of convenience or habit. Seeing things this way allows us to examine
neurasthenia as a closed system, but it also requires us to accept problematic
historical elisions like the ones Rebecca Hyman (1998: 8) makes when she
claims that George Beard ‘discovered’ the disease in 1869 (which he did
not) and that it ‘suddenly disappeared’ decades later (which it did not). If
neurasthenia is dead, it must be because we killed it – we have murdered to
dissect, but at the expense of a more thorough and nuanced understanding
of the disease, its history and the scope of its cultural work.
While the evidence above gives us reason to reconsider how and where we
pinpoint its passing, it is less important to identify when neurasthenia died
than it is to ask what this supposedly ‘Victorian’ disease bequeathed to the
modern world from which it is supposed to have vanished. I would contend
that this is not exclusively or even essentially a Victorian disease at all, but
when we insist on the easy alignment of its death with the end of World War
I, or claim that ‘the lifespan of neurasthenia corresponds to the period of
realism in American literature’ (Lutz, 1991: 36), we implicitly accept that
this disease was really just another late nineteenth-century phenomenon
which, like so many other of that era’s fads and fashions, crumbled under
the pressures of modernism.
I would rather see neurasthenia as not simply a preface to American
modernism, but to some degree constitutive of it, and in this paper I offer
an interpretation of neurasthenia which reads it as a discourse of modern
American identity as well as a discourse of disease – one which was intimately
bound up with early twentieth-century politics of nationalism and citizenship.
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I begin by examining the emergence of neurasthenia in America 1 in the
nineteenth century, emphasizing George Beard’s seminal contributions to
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its formation and popularization. I then consider neurasthenia in vogue,
paying particular attention to the conditions of its popularity and the features
of its crisis in the early part of the twentieth century. My primary purpose
here will be to show that neurasthenia does not simply anticipate but is preeminently preoccupied with the questions and crises of modernity; that it
is not, after all, a quintessentially Victorian but a fundamentally modernist
discourse, and a paradigmatic example of how the construction of a neurotic
American subject was necessarily and inevitably a construction of a modern
American subject.
In the paper’s final section, I turn to examine more closely the implications of
this particular construction of ‘American’, asking how and why the prejudices
of neurasthenic discourse and, more specifi cally, its racist assumptions, were
so readily accepted and circulated in the early twentieth century. I suggest that
one way to understand how the social logic of neurasthenia became so fi rmly
entrenched is by considering it in light of the nineteenth-century’s ‘insanity
question’ – a question largely overlooked by historians of psychiatry and so
far entirely unexamined as a context for and collaborator with neurasthenic
discourse. By illuminating the features and functions of this question, I show
how it inspired and conspired with neurasthenia to construct a relationship
between race, nation and neurosis that would preoccupy writers on both
sides of the colour line well into the twentieth century.
The advent and ascent of ‘the American disease’
Although, despite his own claims to the contrary, George Beard did not
coin the term ‘neurasthenia’, he was more than any other responsible for
shepherding it towards international recognition and its status as a national
preoccupation .2 By no means was he the only one writing about neurasthenia in
the nineteenth century, but he was the first to popularize it deliberately – to see
and articulate its value not simply for a specialized scientifi c audience, but a
broadly national one as well. In Beard’s American Nervousness (1881),
popularity was the point, and while he claims that this presentation of
neurasthenia was ‘designed as a supplement’ to his more narrowly scientifi c
treatise on the disease the year before, he quickly acknowledges that it is ‘of a
more distinctly philosophical and popular character’. Indeed, Beard ranges so
widely that readers may be apt to forget they are reading a work of neurology
at all, containing as it does so many curious asides and manifold musings on
everything from the American educational system to the ‘phenomenal beauty
of the American girl’. American Nervousness is, in short, a veritable index of
the nation’s ideas, attitudes, assumptions and prejudices which has its feet
firmly planted in the nineteenth century but its eyes clearly fi xed upon the
twentieth. It was, if not the earliest, then certainly the most powerful and
5

coherent articulation of national identity in terms of disease, and it would
almost single-handedly bring the unlikely concept of neurasthenia into the
mainstream of nineteenth-century America.
That neurasthenia is as much an identity as a disease is evident almost
from the beginning of American Nervousness. Beard’s initial portrait of the
neurasthenic highlights the ‘fi ne, soft hair, delicate skin [and] nicely chiselled
features’ which distinguish this population of sufferers (Beard, 1881: 26). We
will not find here the ‘thickness of the lip’ or the irregular ‘size of the nose’ that
marks the ‘less refi ned’ sort: the barbarians, the savages and, more curiously,
the English when viewed up close (p. 69). On the contrary, neurasthenics are
comparatively dainty, with ‘small bones’ and ‘tapering extremities’ (p. 26).
They may have bad teeth, but this is a product of their sensitiveness and their
whiteness: Indians and Negroes, Beard notes, ‘suffer but little this way’ (p. 49).
Fortunately, neurasthenics can afford good dentists, for they are, not surprisingly, of the ‘better sort’: the ‘in-door classes’ or ‘brain-workers’ (p. 23),
as Beard called them, ‘the professional and business men of America’ upon
whom the country’s success and progress depend (p. 23). Chances are that
a neurasthenic is balding, for this is one of the ‘minor but most instructive
expressions of nerve sensitiveness’, as well as a useful marker of whiteness,
for ‘[a]mong savages in all parts of the earth baldness is unusual’ (p. 52). If
the neurasthenic happens to be a woman, she will not be balding, but she
will almost inevitably be beautiful and weak – her indoor lifestyle robs her of
the strength of ‘the squaws’ (p. 185), but it also keeps her pretty. A ‘woman
who works all day in the fi eld’, after all, ‘is not likely to be very handsome,
nor to be the mother of handsome daughters’ (p. 67).
Neurasthenics also sound different, clipping their words because full enunciation ‘makes severe draughts on time and force’ (p. 85). For the same
reason, neurasthenics are not dressed in bright, garish colours because ‘higher
culture and sensitive nerves react to slight irritation; while low culture and
insensitive nerves require strong irritation. Loudness of dress is, therefore,
justly regarded as proof of coarseness of nerve-fi bre’ (p. 74). Too much colour,
in other words, taxes the neurasthenic’s energy reserves.
The remaining features of neurasthenics are rather predictable: they are
Protestant, for ‘[no] Catholic country is very nervous’ (p. 126) and they primarily reside in the cities of the North, where nervous diseases are ‘more
frequent and more complex’ (p. 159). They are also inveterate letter-writers,
this activity being peculiarly ‘American’ and an ‘index of nervousness’ (p. 135) –
perhaps because it suggests a level of literacy one would naturally, in Beard’s
terms, associate with this class of sufferers.
What we must fi nally see in this scrupulous study of neurasthenic identity is
that Beard, after all, was describing himself, along with the class of patients he
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saw and treated in his private New York neurological practice: white, wealthy,
urban Northerners, primarily men 3 of the brain-working class, men of the
‘desk, the pulpit and ... the counting room’ (p. 26), responsible for keeping
the engine of civilization running. These individuals were the inevitable effect
of a disease, the ‘chief and primary’ cause of which was, in Beard’s aetiology,
‘modern civilization’ – a broad concept defi ned not just by the technological
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innovations of the nineteenth century, ‘steam-power, the periodical press,
the telegraph, the sciences’, but by social ones as well: ‘the mental activity of
women’, for instance, and the sometimes disturbingly liberal ‘civil, political,
religious and business’ institutions of the United States (p. vi).
As a disease of modern civilization, neurasthenia would accordingly affect
most severely those who were supposedly on its leading edge. Indeed, the kind
of work one did was an important component of neurasthenia’s aetiology.
As Roy Porter (2001: 42) put it, ‘American nervousness was a disease of
labour’, but not the sort performed in a factory or a fi eld. As Beard makes
clear, only ‘brain-work’ counts – the kind of labour that truly drives American
progress, continually refi nes American civilization, and, most importantly,
makes America wealthy. It is the heroic ambition, incessant worrying and
unceasing labour that so heavily tax the already sensitive nervous systems
of these individuals; but it is also, thanks to them, that America enjoys the
level of prosperity that it does. As Beard (1881: 97) writes:
All our civilization hangs by a thread; the activity and force of the very
few make us what we are as a nation; and if, through degeneracy, the
descendants of these few revert to the condition of their not very remote
ancestors, all our haughty civilization would be wiped away.

Civilization, in other words, is ‘paid for by nervousness’ (p. 76) and it is to the
nervous that civilization owes its thanks. If, after all, so many of the material
spoils seem to go to them, it is rightly so, for, as Beard unapologetically explains (pp. 302–3):
[T]he lower must minister to the higher ... For every brain-worker there
must be ten muscle-workers ... that a few thousand might cultivate the
intellect, hundreds of thousands must cultivate the soil ... The America
of the future, as the America of the present, must be a nation where riches
and culture are restricted to the few.

As lopsided as this system is, the alternative is even worse: cultural degeneracy.
In the logic of American Nervousness , it is better to be poor in a civilized
country than rich in a degenerate one.
What Beard ultimately accomplished in his articulation of the disease is
something unexpected and extraordinary in a work which would ostensibly
seem to be so narrowly medical and of interest only to a specialized few. He
found a way, through neurasthenia, to lend scientifi c credence to and provide a
biological basis for the social position and political ideologies of the white
American upper classes. Neurasthenia was their disease: the exclusive price
and privilege of this class and these kinds of people – a ‘badge of honor’, as
it has been called (Lutz, 1991: 275); the sign and province of Fifth Avenue
rather than the Five Points. As late as 1917, and well after the disease is sup8

posed to have fallen out of fashion, one writer could still refer to it as a fi rmly
‘aristocratic’ disorder (Carroll, 1917: 23), and though Beard never used such

explicitly elitist terms, neurasthenia was clearly theorized and recognized as
a problem of the prosperous.
And yet, without acknowledging the apparent contradiction, Beard would
also claim that neurasthenia was broadly ‘American’. It was, to be sure, a
‘distinguished malady’, but it was also something which all Americans should
be proud of and, at least implicitly, capable of. Like his theory of the body as
dynamo (Beard, 1881: 98–9) or his mathematical expression of the disease’s
aetiology (p. 176) – with all their ostensible scientifi c objectivism and universalism – Beard’s nationalistic rhetoric seems inclusive and would appear
to address itself to a more generally American than exclusively aristocratic
audience.
In American Nervousness, Beard’s nationalism is evident from preface to
postscript. After briefl y outlining the disease and summarizing its causes, he
veritably gushes (pp. vii–viii):
All this is modern, and originally American; and no age, no country,
and no form of civilization, not Greece, nor Rome, nor Spain, nor the
Netherlands, in the days of their glory, possessed such maladies. Of all
the facts of modern sociology, this rise and growth of functional nervous
disease in the northern part of America is one of the most stupendous,
complex, and suggestive; to solve it in all its interlacings ... is to solve the
problem of sociology itself.

Neurasthenia was thus an American original. It put the country not simply
on par with but above the great ancient civilizations, and might even help the
world solve its fundamentally human problems. Beard’s language is telling
here not only for its enthusiasm – ‘stupendous’, ‘marvelous’, ‘glor[ious]’ – but
for its imperialism. By invoking Greece and Rome, Beard figured America
not simply as a country, but as an empire in which neurasthenia was not
just a disease but a ‘possession’. For Beard, neurasthenia offered America a
way out from underneath the shadow of the Continent, something that ‘shall
make Europe follow us, instead of our following Europe’ (p. xvii). As Beard
laments (pp. xvii–xviii):
Long enough this babyland of science has fed on the crumbs that fall from
Germany’s table; corn and fruits we are carrying to the old country; let
new ideas of fresh discoveries go with them. Better to criticise and confi rm
than be idle; but wiser far to make others criticise and confi rm.

The rhetoric is familiar, even if it appears in a most unlikely context: Beard
employs neurasthenia to demand and engender national spirit, solidarity
and ingenuity on an Emersonian and Whitmanian scale. The very fact of
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neurasthenia was an index of the nation’s glory; its study and dissemination
could be America’s greatest contribution to human history; and its slow but
steady rise may well secure the country’s international dominance. As Beard
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imagines it, just as the ‘philosophy of Germany has penetrated to all civilized
nations’, so the ‘nervousness of America is extending over Europe, which, in
certain countries, at least, is becoming rapidly Americanized’ (p. 14). He sees
the ‘symptoms’ of neurasthenia ‘invad[ing] Great Britain and the Continent’
(p. 57), and he refers to neurasthenics themselves as an ‘army of sufferers’
(p. 22) as large as that of Russia’s standing army – suggesting perhaps that if
the symptoms themselves cannot win the metaphorical war he invokes here,
America will send a battalion of neurasthenics.
Much more than a simple disease, neurasthenia was a veritable force of
Americanization. It was a sign of modernity, a point of national pride and
the motor of American empire, and it was upon these grounds that the
country’s enthusiasm for the disease was most fi rmly established. As a
scientifi c explanation for sometimes suspicious complaints, it was popular
with patients. As a cover-all for a disturbingly incoherent set of symptoms,
it was popular with doctors. As a justifi cation of the social status quo and
a rationalization of capitalism, it was popular with the country’s dominant
classes. By figuring the disease as thoroughly and pre-eminently ‘American’,
however, Beard attempted to secure for it an unqualifi ed popularity and by all
accounts his efforts were wildly successful. Only a few years after he published
American Nervousness, neurasthenia would become known the world over
as ‘the American disease’. The title of an 1894 McClure’s article hailed it
as ‘the national disease of America’ (Wakefi eld, 1894); Annie Payson Call
(189 1) referred to it as ‘Americanitis’; and even Dana (1904: 34 1) registered
its national importance by noting in supremely facetious but no less telling
terms that the disease was one of America’s ‘most distinctive and precious
pathological possessions ... an important stimulus to patriotism and racial
solidarity!’.
What we must see here, then, is that ultimately Beard was not just constructing a disease nor even a specifi cally American disease, but also a particular
kind of American. Like other projects of its time and of the coming modernist
era, Beard’s was a nationalistic one which sought to defi ne what ‘America’
means and who qualifi es as ‘American’. Neurasthenia was not only a discourse
of disease, but of national identity. It might have been American, but it was
hardly democratic, for to be neurasthenic was not simply to be ‘sick’, but to be
white, wealthy, educated, sensitive and refi ned (and to have come from a long
line of such folk). Beard was not brandishing a simple, broad or universalizing
sort of nationalism: he was trying to create a particular nation, one identifi ed
with and driven by its neurotics. His was one of the many ‘nationalisms’ being
proffered at the time, but it was singular and signifi cant for the way that it
articulated a relationship not just between race and nation, but among race,
modernity, nation and neurosis – a relationship whose assumptions would be
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absorbed by the twentieth century’s psychoanalytic paradigm and perpetuated
long after the disease was supposed to have fallen out of fashion.
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From vogue to rogue: the crisis of neurasthenia in the twentieth
century
Certainly, neurasthenia had its share of detractors from the start. Only fi ve
years after Beard published American Nervousness, Sir Andrew Clark, an elite
British medical consultant, summarily concluded that:
Neurasthenia is unscientifi c, inaccurate and misleading ... the descriptions
given of it do not include a clear, concise, or distinctive account of genuine
nerve exhaustion, and do include a mob of incoherent symptoms borrowed
from the most diverse disorder. (quoted in Sengoopta, 2001: 103)

Although Clark’s was a rather lonely voice at the time, the criticisms embedded
here – that neurasthenia is an essentially overloaded and therefore useless
diagnosis – would be resurrected and refi ned by twentieth-century medical
critics of the disease. What was once the source of neurasthenia’s value for
doctors – that it united a large, confusing and contradictory set of symptoms
in a single, authoritative diagnosis – became for many the basis of an attack.
Too many doctors, it seems, abused neurasthenia as an easy and convenient
diagnosis for whatever they did not understand. The disease devolved into
what one doctor called the ‘garbage can’ of medicine, a sort of ‘dumping
ground’ (Brill, 1930: 123–4) for patients whose symptoms doctors could not
competently diagnose or did not want to take the time to understand. Brill
recalls one of his medical school teachers remarking that ‘whatever puzzles
you on the skin you can safely diagnose as eczema and whatever you cannot
diagnose on a physical basis you can safely call neurasthenia’ (p. 122). This
kind of lazy medicine was, in the words of another practitioner, ‘bad business’ –
a shirking of responsibility and ‘eva[sion] of duty’ which heaped dishonour
upon more conscientious physicians (quoted in Brill, 1930: 124).
Also, neurasthenia was becoming over-commercialized, ripe for abuse by
doctors and institutions who put profi ts before patients. Dana (1904: 331)
took a subtle jab at this neurasthenic ‘market’ when he noted that if neurasthenia were to disappear, it would no doubt have its ‘most tragic effect on
the European professors whom our wandering plutocracy consults; and by
whom the diagnosis of the “American Disease” is usually made as the patient
is announced’. Indeed, sanatoriums, health retreats and private practices on
both sides of the Atlantic did a healthy business in nervous disorders and, as
Dana suggests here, were only too happy to embrace (and perhaps enable)
the American malady. Just as neurasthenia was misused by lazy doctors as a
cover for incompetence, so too was it abused by the market as an easy mode
of profi t. In either case, the bottom line was the same: neurasthenia had
become a threat to the profession’s integrity.
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We find a similar indictment of neurasthenia’s commercialization in nonmedical discourse as well. In his short story ‘Let Me Feel Your Pulse: Adventures in Neurasthenia’, O. Henry (1911: 157–8) describes the sanatorium
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his narrator visits as kind of summer camp for the rich, full of ‘turning-lathes,
carpenters’ outfi ts, clay-modelling tools ... everything, seemingly, that could
interest the paying lunatic guests of a fi rst-rate sanitarium’. Much more a
playground than a hospital, Henry’s neurasthenic health retreat is the place
where the wealthy go not for a cure but for an escape, and the doctors there
are only too happy to accommodate them. As Henry repeatedly observes,
doctors are quick to diagnose neurasthenia and shuffl e their patients off to
these retreats (no doubt with an eye towards a kickback), where the staff
seems equally uninterested in diagnostic or therapeutic usefulness. After
only minutes with the narrator-patient, the physician in charge at the retreat
prescribes an absurdly ungrounded, Sisyphisian remedy: ‘I think the best
mental relaxation for you would be throwing small boulders over the mountainside and then bringing them up again’ (p. 158).
This critique of commercialism was elaborated even further in William
Taylor Marrs’ satirical pseudo-autobiography Confessions of a Neurasthenic
(1908). Written from the perspective of a lifelong, ‘professional’ neurasthenic,
the autobiography describes the genesis and adventures of a sufferer, following him from one potential cure to another as he attempts (only ever
half-heartedly) to rid himself of the disease. To be sure, the autobiography
is a joke, complete with humorous illustrations, and this is perhaps one
reason it has received so little attention from historians and scholars. But if
we simply dismiss it as a bit of irreverent fun, we miss one of the most fully
articulated and important indictments of the disease and those who claimed
to suffer from it.
Like O. Henry, Marrs condemns the over-commercialization of the disease.
In an unusually humour-free passage, he claims that American health retreats
for neurasthenics and other invalids are largely the product not of patients’
needs but the economic interests of those who profi t from them: the ‘land sharks,
railroads’ and ‘hotel and sanitarium people’ themselves (Marrs, 1908: 81).
The narrator roams the country, hopping from one fashionable retreat to
another, ultimately finding not a cure but a con: ‘Everywhere I went I saw
hundreds of victims being shorn of their money and deriving meager, if
any, benefi ts’ (p. 82). Like the druggists who sold watered-down medicine
because real drugs ‘cost money’ (p. 68) or the medical advertisements that
promised cures only to ‘deceive the sick’ and ‘take their money’ (p. 31), the
sanatoriums were just another part of a medical market which itself produced,
perpetuated and pilfered neurasthenics.
By no means should we believe, however, that Marrs (or O. Henry) sympathized with swindled sufferers. On the contrary, what seems to distinguish
the popular backlash against the disease from the medical one is its focus
not so much on neurasthenia, but on neurasthenics. When we examine what
evidence we have of the public’s understanding of the disease in the early
15

twentieth century, we find it was concerned not so much with the uselessness
of neurasthenia as a diagnostic category, or even with the lackadaisical doctors
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who diagnosed it as a matter of convenience, but with the neurasthenics
themselves, who, far from Beard’s tireless brain-worker, had come to be seen
as lazy, self-indulgent opportunists. Because neurasthenia could only ever
exist as equal parts discourse and performance – in other words, because it
was only legible via patients’ words and behaviour – it didn’t take people long
to realize that it could be appropriated simply by performing it.
The rhetoric became sharper in the twentieth century, when critics voiced
a concerted disdain for the neurasthenic’s essential laziness. Smith Ely Jeliffe
fired a pointed salvo when he claimed of these sufferers that ‘Laziness, indifference, weakness of mind and supersensitiveness characterize them all’
(quoted in Porter, 2001: 41). He suggests that the cause of their illness is a
simple ‘lack of moral courage’, a subtle refl ection, perhaps, of the philosophy
of the self-help culture which emerged in the fi rst quarter of the twentieth
century. Carroll’s The Mastery of Nervousness (1917) was part of this self-help
genre, emphasizing the power of the individual to overcome neurasthenia.
For him, too, neurasthenics were fundamentally lazy, but also ‘shrewd’,
managing to ‘secure periodic vacations, comfortably spent under hospital or
sanitarium care, or a long rest at some health resort, through an opportune
breakdown of this type’ (p. 23).
Almost a decade before Carroll, however, Marrs provided the defi nitive
representation of this sly and indolent neurasthenic in Confessions. Lazy and
opportunistic, Marrs’ narrator knows how to use medical theory to authorize
his laziness. Invoking Beard and then turning him on his head, the narrator
claims that because he ‘believe[s] in the conservation of energy’ (Marrs,
1908: 15), he fears ‘working too hard’ (p. 24). If the idea is, as Beard put it,
to ration one’s nerve force, what better way to avoid a breakdown than by
never expending any energy at all? Besides, as far as the narrator is concerned,
being neurasthenic is a job:
Yes, Webster defi nes a job as being an undertaking. Neurasthenia is
certainly an ‘undertaking’, therefore it must be a job – a big one at that.
It interferes with the holding of any more remunerative job and consumes
most of one’s time trying to keep his health in a passable condition. (p. 50)

But why, at this point in the disease’s history, should there be so much fuss
over these perhaps dissembling but otherwise seemingly innocuous types? It
must be because lazy neurasthenics represented something more than just
an occasion for moral reproach. Indeed, their wilful idleness constituted a
threat to a modern America bent on achievement, progress and the triumph
of civilization over barbarism. Common to Jeliffe’s, Carroll’s and Marrs’
condemnations of this type is an emphasis on productivity, and Carroll
(1917: 23) even euphemizes neurasthenic breakdowns as ‘lapses from pro17

ductiveness’. More than simply morally weak, these neurasthenics were
unproductive. Ironically, they undermined that characteristically American
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work ethic that Beard and his contemporaries considered a veritable sign of
the neurasthenic.
Perhaps not surprisingly then, we find that this particular criticism of neurasthenia emerges alongside another which assails it as a threat to masculinity.
If, as Michael North (2001: 174) claims, one of early modernism’s announced
targets was ‘the ladylike’, it is no wonder neurasthenia came under fi re.
For instance, Marrs (1908: 12) foregrounds the seemingly fundamental
effeminacy of neurasthenia by consistently feminizing his male narrator. His
neurasthenic notes that as a child, he ‘did not engage in the usual sports and
rampages of boys’, nor did he have any ‘boyish ambition to be a cowboy or
desperado’ (p. 13). The narrator does, however, admit a desire to join the
circus: ‘Yes, I was going to be an acrobat and wear pretty red tights with
glittering spangles!’ (p. 14). He twice labels himself ‘effeminate’ (pp. 27,
35), and in one instance admits to blushing with ‘maidenly’ shame (p. 92).
What Marrs seems to be suggesting, after all, is that male neurasthenics are
not just essentially lazy, but essentially feminine and, as such, threaten both
the moral and masculine imperatives of (re)production.
Attacks like the ones levelled by Marrs, Jeliffe and others did to some degree
diminish neurasthenia’s popularity and prestige, but it nevertheless managed
to endure long after the height of its own controversy – a controversy which
illuminates the ways in which neurasthenia was thoroughly imbricated in
modernist anxieties over gender and production, and which suggests that
neurasthenia may be, after all, not simply a prelude to but a meaningful
component of modernism.
But the neurasthenic crisis of the early twentieth century offers at least one
more point to consider. For what seems most remarkable is that nowhere
among the various medical and popular challenges to neurasthenia do we find
anyone who seems to contest the disease on the ideological grounds upon
which Beard formulated it. No one, for instance, questions its exclusive relationship with whiteness or its fundamental association with privilege; no
one seems to interrogate the contradiction inherent in an idea which claims
to represent American identity while excluding most Americans. No one,
in other words, seems to question the essential relationship between race,
nation and neurosis that Beard originally proposed. Rather, as the nineteenth
century gives way to the twentieth, as soma gives way to psyche, and as Beard
gives way to Freud, we find perpetuated over and over again – in scientifi c
treatises, newspapers and dramatic and literary works – the assumption that
truly neurotic disorders are the province of the white and privileged. This, we
know, is one of the most important prejudices that neurasthenia bequeaths
to the modern era, but it is less certain why this prejudice was so readily
accepted and circulated. The following section addresses this question,
offering a new context for neurasthenia which explains how, by dovetailing
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with the nineteenth-century’s ‘insanity question’, its prejudices became firmly
entrenched in the twentieth century.
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Neurasthenia and the ‘insanity question’: colour-coding mental
disease
To the catalogue of ‘great questions’ which preoccupied America in the
nineteenth century, scholars and historians have failed to add the insanity
question. In broad strokes, I am referring here to a national conversation
about and anxiety over the relationship between modernization and mental
illness which, in its interrogative form, often sounded something like this: ‘Is
the number of insane increasing and, if so, is it a function of “civilization”?’
Depending upon where and how we locate the genesis of this question, it predates the emergence of neurasthenia by decades or centuries. George Rosen
(1958: 8) claims that people on both sides of the Atlantic had been asking
the question since the eighteenth century, implicitly pinning its emergence
to the rise of industrialism. In America, we certainly fi nd suggestions of this
concern in the late eighteenth-century writings of Benjamin Rush, but the
question seems to take on a new urgency and a decidedly racial tenor in
the 1840s, after the publication in 1841 of the seminal sixth census of the
USA. This question was hardly the innocent inquiry of a nation trying to
measure and reassure itself in the face of rapid progress and innovation. On
the contrary, it was a highly-loaded, highly-racialized refl ection of a hyper‘civilized’ nation’s anxiety over its relationship to its uncivilized Other:
the so-called ‘barbarian’ or ‘savage’, terms which always more specifi cally
signifi ed immigrants, Native Americans and, especially, African Americans,
to whom Beard (1881: 189) once referred as the ‘bit of barbarism at our
door-steps’. I will briefl y outline and examine this question to suggest how
the discourse of insanity provided fertile ground for Beard’s formulation of
neurasthenia, and would cooperate with it well into the twentieth century to
defi ne the limits of black psychology and adjudicate the relationship between
race, modernity, nation and neurosis.
As Edward Jarvis notes in his response to the sixth census of the USA, the
report was to serve as something of a watershed in the history of insanity, for
while the subject and its statistics had long been important to various parties,
there had never been any ‘complete and accurate account of the number
of these unfortunate sufferers in any country, or race, or class of people’.
Accordingly, the ‘numerous’ investigations of insanity published previously
were often contradictory, based as they were on inevitably ‘partial’ truths
(Jarvis, 1844: 71). The sixth census would be the fi rst attempt to gather such
numbers on a large and useful scale, and Jarvis summarizes the signifi cance
of the undertaking when he observes that a ‘wider field than this had never
been surveyed for this purpose in any part of the earth, since the world
began’ (p. 72).
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The mandate delivered to the 1840 census marshals suggested an interest
in a wide range of disabilities, including deafness, blindness and idiocy, as
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well as insanity. Of particular concern to the government, however, was not
just the sheer number of those disabled, but also how those numbers divided
along racial lines (predictably, the only races distinguished here were black
and white). The mandate itself did not articulate any motive for gathering
this information, but if the uses to which the numbers were ultimately put
are any indication, the purpose of the census was thoroughly entangled in
the politics of slavery.
The insanity statistics published in the sixth census garnered international
attention for the single, startling conclusion they suggested: insanity was
apparently ‘eleven times more frequent for the African in freedom as in
slavery’ (Jarvis, 1844: 74). This suggestion was remarkable for many reasons,
not the least of which was that it contradicted the widespread, long-held
primitivist assumption that blacks could never really be insane – one of a
number of racial immunity myths which held that blacks were also impervious
to the effects of alcohol (Patton, 1911), yellow fever, chorea and prostate
cancer (Clark, 1897–98). As J. D. Roberts (1883: 3) says in his study of insanity in the ‘colored race’, ‘It is generally believed that the Negro ... is not
as liable to become insane as the more civilized nations’. After all, in a race
noted for its ‘native cheerfulness and good humor’ (O’Malley, 1914: 334)
and its naturally ‘jolly [and] careless’ approach to life (Bevis, 1921: 71), how
could there be anything but a consistent and simple sanity?
Yet with no scruples about the way such evidence undermined the primitivist logic upon which American racial relations were based, Southern US
writers seized upon the figures as a justifi cation for slavery – a ‘new reason
for conservatism of the peculiar institutions of the south’ (Jarvis, 1844: 74).
After all, they insisted, if slavery is over ten-fold more favourable to mental
health than freedom, why emancipate? As Jarvis shrewdly realized, the
evidence would be twisted into a consolation for slaves, with the South reassuring them that ‘although another man’s will governs them, yet their minds
are not bound with insane delusions, nor crushed in idiocy, as are those of
their brethren, who govern themselves’ (p. 74).
As it turned out, the 1840 census was egregiously flawed, both statistically
and methodologically, and Jarvis (p. 75) exposed it for the ‘fallacious and
self-condemning document’ that it is. After examining the individual returns
for each state, Jarvis uncovered some absurd and disturbing inconsistencies.
For instance, in Searboro, Maine, where the marshals found no coloured
inhabitants, they nonetheless reported six coloured insane. In other towns,
every coloured inhabitant was reported to be insane. The census was also
methodologically flawed in ways we can well imagine. What, for instance, were
the guidelines for defi ning and recording insanity? How did marshals who,
as Jarvis (p. 79) observes, ‘obtain their information at second hand, from the
reports of others’, verify the condition? And why weren’t marshals instructed
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to distinguish more clearly ‘between the slave and free negro at the south’
(p. 82)? For Jarvis (p. 83), it all points towards one conclusion:
[T]he ‘sixth census’ has contributed nothing to the statistical nosology of
the free blacks, and furnished us with no data whereon we may build any
theory respecting the liability of humanity, in its different phases and in
various outward circumstances, to loss of reason or of the senses.

And yet, despite Jarvis’s irrefutable evidence, eloquent arguments, and rather
dramatic call for the next Congress to mandate a revision of the document,
sloppy census-taking continued long after his report.
Certainly, the story of the sixth census illuminates one of the underexamined
grounds upon which slavery was based and upon which abolitionists like Jarvis
fought for emancipation, but I rehearse it here not to examine it as another
dimension of the slavery discussion, but to suggest it as the starting point
of another. For it seems that what the sixth census ultimately sparks is a
national discussion about and reconsideration of the relationship between
race and insanity that infl ects Beard’s articulation of neurasthenia and, with
it, structures the nation’s thinking about race and neurosis well into the
twentieth century.
It is hardly a coincidence that interest in the insanity question intensifi ed
around the time Beard was articulating his theory of neurasthenia. After all,
it was in 1880 – the year Beard wrote American Nervousness and published
A Practical Treatise on Nervous Exhaustion – that the US government conducted
the tenth census, the results of which would, to an even greater degree than in
1840, stoke the nation’s interest in the relationship between race and insanity.
By offering the fi rst set of statistically meaningful post-Civil War fi gures, the
1880 census allowed observers to compare not just the state of the nation
before and after the war but, more specifi cally, the mental health of blacks
before and after slavery – and it was what the figures suggested on this latter
point that garnered the most attention and apprehension. In short, the tenth
census seemed to document a veritable explosion of insanity among African
Americans since the Civil War, with numbers ‘fast approximating that of the
white population’ (Witmer, 1891: 24). While in 1860, the ‘colored insane’
numbered only 1 in every 5798, by 1880 the figure had risen to 1 in every
1069 (Roberts, 1883: 4–5). The phenomenon spawned a veritable genre of
medical journal articles seeking to investigate – and almost always titled –
‘insanity in the colored race’, but the conversation was hardly limited to a
small circle of physicians. On the contrary, the question was, according to one
writer, of ‘vital concern’ to social science and all those interested in human
development (Mays, 1897: 537), while for another it was one of ‘magnitude
to the people of the United States’ in general (Witmer, 1891: 24). Indeed, by
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1881 a bill had been introduced in the House of Representatives to investigate
the causes of the general increase in insanity, an endeavour which Beard
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himself observed in American Nervousness and which he believed marked ‘an
advance in the popular interest in one of the great questions of this age or
of any age’ (Beard, 1881: 27).
Yet, while it easy enough to observe with Beard the popularity of the
insanity question in the late nineteenth century, it is somewhat harder
to account for it. Why did it qualify as one of the age’s ‘great’ questions?
What were the motives for asking it? And what kinds of answers were being
provided? We find a suggestion of what was at stake in J. M. Buchanan’s
1886 study of race and insanity, which begins by observing that for an ‘age
in which we proudly boast that civilization has reached its acme ... it is an
unpleasant thought to consider that this higher development has brought
in its train an alarming increase in insanity’ (Buchanan, 1886: 1). It is important to note the way this passage positions the discussion of insanity
within the context of ‘civilization’ and a narrative of progress. Insanity here
is not simply a dreadful disease, but an indication of advancement; it might
be ‘unpleasant’, but it is also the inevitable, unavoidable function of ‘higher
development’ – the by-product of a culture at its ‘acme’. In short, insanity,
like the neurasthenia which sometimes precipitated it,4 is a sign of civilization
and a marker of modernity, and this is why the increase of the disease in
the ‘colored race’ presented such a problem. For if, as Beard (1881: 189)
put it, it would be a ‘joke’ to suggest that African Americans could ever be
insane, let alone neurasthenic, and if, after all, insanity was the province of
the ‘civilized’ and a measure of their progress, then how could the number
of black insane really approach that of the white? As in 1840, the 1880 census
numbers seemingly threatened a fundamental tenet of primitivist logic and
one of the distinguishing features of racial identity: a susceptibility to and
capacity for the complex neuroses of civilization. Proponents of primitivism
needed to account for and contain this apparent contradiction, and they did
this by drawing a colour line right through the concept of insanity.
Rather than challenge the results of the 1880 census or question the
accuracy of the fi gures, writers on the insanity question instead worked to
establish a difference between black and white mental illness. Roberts (1883:
10–11), for instance, emphasized the disparities in the character of the disease
as it appeared in the two races:
As a class the insanity of the Negro appeals to a lower order of feelings;
he is more profane; more vulgar; naturally less cleanly than his white
neighbor, in insanity his fi lthiness is almost appalling, and he cares less
for the proprieties of life. In fact he seems to approach nearer the brute
creation in his insanity ... We do not have to look far for a cause for this
difference, when we consider the wide gap there is between the races in
reference to refi nement, intelligence, accomplishments, social status, etc.
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Though Roberts (p. 11) concedes that not ‘all colored insane are of a violent,
profane and vulgar type’, the passage above implies that any other kind would

be a rare exception. For Roberts, the disparity between the types of insanity
experienced by blacks and whites is the product of ‘natural’ rather than
environmental differences: the Negro’s biologically-encoded apathy towards
hygiene, his inherent disregard for ‘proprieties’, etc. In these terms, there
would seem to be little chance that the ‘colored insane’ could be anything
other than the ‘violent, profane and vulgar’ sort of lunatics that Roberts
describes – a description shot through with the rhetoric and assumptions of
primitivism. For Roberts, black insanity is of a ‘lower order’ which pushes
its already uncivilized subject ever closer to ‘brute creation’, increasing the
‘animal propensities’ that characterize the race even when sane. Far from a
mark of modernity, insanity here serves only to magnify the race’s supposed
barbarism: it mirrors the race’s fundamental coarseness rather than suggests
it is approaching (or even capable of) white ‘refi nement’. Roberts thus
ultimately manages to reposition the race within a traditional evolutionist
framework and thereby to contain any threat to primitivist logic posed by
the census numbers. Black insanity – like the race itself – is reassuringly of
a ‘lower order’, which suggests not that the race is advancing, but devolving
ever further towards ‘brute creation’. The incidence of black insanity might
be fast approximating that of the white population, but the race cannot claim
it, as whites do, as a sign of ‘higher development’ (p. 11).
Just as the character of insanity differed along the colour line, so did the
mode of its acquisition. In other words, how one became insane was just
as important as the character of the insanity itself. Indeed, every article on
‘insanity in the colored race’ demonstrates a marked concern with the disease’s aetiology, and the parity between these accounts is astonishing. For
all these writers, the root cause of black insanity is the same: the freedom
granted by emancipation. Most of these texts feature some sort of ‘common
sense’ claim that prewar insanity among blacks was virtually non-existent.
Buchanan (1886: 2), for instance, bluntly insists that ‘any slave-owner will
tell you that insanity among the negroes was a rare occurrence before the
war; Witmer (1891: 19) offers that ‘many intelligent people’ have told him
that ‘while they had known of colored idiots and epileptics before the war,
they never had heard of an insane colored person’; and Mays (1897: 537–8)
cites no less than eight medical authorities who all testify to the absence of
insanity under slavery.
Yet, how could freedom so seriously jeopardize black sanity while slavery,
with all of its well-documented horrors and abuses, apparently preserve it?
As J. F. Miller explains in his 1896 study:
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The negro in slavery had ‘no thought for the morrow,’ wherewithal he
should be fed and clothed. Nor did the claims of family press upon him
to worry and affect his mind; no ambitious hopes stirred his brain as to
the possibilities of his future; but ‘far from the madding crowd’s ignoble
strife’ he spent his quiet, humble life in his little log cabin, with his master
to care for every want of self and family, in sickness and in health.
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It is an undisputed fact, known to our Southern people, that no race of
men ever lived under better hygienic restraints ... Freedom came to him,
and a change came over his entire life. (quoted in Mays, 1897: 539)

This passage, with its appalling lack of awareness, is typical of the genre for
its nostalgic sentimentalism and its suggestion that blacks were never insane
before the war for the same reason that children never are: they were wholly
guarded and provided for, living ever in the present, free of the strains and
strife suffered by their civilized betters. Freedom forced former slaves to confront ‘civilization’ which, according to Miller’s logic, made demands ‘upon
the negro which his intellectual parts were unable to discharge’ (Mays, 1897:
539). Black insanity in this sense is the product of limited mental capacity –
a mind unfi t for civilization. Mays (p. 539) puts a fi ner point on it when he
writes that ‘[i]f we fully realize that the negro came out of the darkness of
Egypt and was brought face to face with a civilization ... it cannot surprise
any one that in many instances he is unequal to the task of adjusting himself
... and falls a prey to disease’. In both cases, we see how the explosion of
black insanity since emancipation can be explained in terms coherent with
primitivist logic: it is just another sign of the race’s cultural inferiority and
its incompatibility with modern American civilization.
Of course, it is not the strain of freedom alone that produces black insanity,
but what the race chooses to do with its freedom. After all, even whites are
susceptible to the stresses of civilization and the pressures of freedom, and
to suggest a common aetiology for insanity in both races would undermine
any effort to distinguish its colour line. Fittingly, then, we fi nd black insanity
figured not really as the consequence of civilization, but of a biological propensity towards licentiousness which, though carefully guarded under slavery,
finds full expression in freedom. As Buchanan (1886: 4) makes clear:
This sudden striking the shackles from his hands gave him not only
freedom from the care and surveillance of his master, but it gave him
liberty which he converted into license to violate and outrage all the
natural and moral laws provided for his well-being.

Notice how and where Buchanan locates the blame for black insanity.
The disease is not simply the result of emancipation or an effect of liberty.
Rather, the Civil War granted the slave freedom, but then he ‘converted it’
to licentiousness, choosing to ‘violate’ the laws of nature and morality by
overindulging base appetites. This is not the sort of insanity found in the
white race which is so often fi gured in compassionate neurasthenic terms
as the result of a refi ned and sensitive nervous system overburdened by the
pressures and responsibilities of civilization. Black insanity is not a noble
neurosis nor, indeed, a neurosis at all. It is, in Buchanan’s terms, more akin
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to a wage of sin, an idiom which lifts the burden of responsibility for the
disease from the shoulders of the abstract forces of ‘civilization’ and transfers

it to black individuals themselves. In these terms, black insanity is as much
the result of a moral as a constitutional weakness.
We see, then, how these writers managed to figure black insanity as both a
product and a refl ection of the race’s evolutionary status: it is, as Roberts originally put it, a ‘lower order’ disease for a supposedly lower order of people –
a timely reassurance of the race’s biological and cultural inferiority for a
Reconstruction-era America increasingly anxious about its racial identity.
By proposing a different character and aetiology for insanity in the coloured
race, these writers drew a vivid colour line through the disease, thereby
defusing one of the threats posed by the post-emancipation explosion of
black insanity. The higher incidence of the disease did not, after all, suggest
that blacks were susceptible in the same way or to the same kinds of mental
illness, nor were they in any way approaching a level of civilization occupied
exclusively by whites. On the contrary, and in the spirit of Beard’s construction of neurasthenia, the reconfi guration of insanity along racial lines
demonstrated that blacks were in no way privy to or even capable of the
refi ned and complex mental illnesses of civilization.
Neurasthenia and insanity are thus similar in more ways than one, and what
I want to highlight here is how these two discourses, emerging at around the
same time, employing the same biological logic and manifesting the same
primitivist assumptions, cooperated to manufacture a particular kind of
American whose identity and modernity were fundamentally predicated upon
a capacity (or lack thereof) for complex, modern neuroses. Like neurasthenia,
the discourse of insanity worked to coordinate race, modernity and mental
illness to establish a particular and exclusive defi nition of national identity
which disqualifi ed a majority of the population. And, like neurasthenia –
or perhaps because of it – the insanity question never really went away.
Well into the twentieth century, and right in the thick of modernism, major
medical journals were still publishing articles which investigated long-familiar
topics. Mary O’Malley’s 1914 study of ‘Psychoses in the colored race’, for
instance, kept alive the ‘discussion of the relative proportion of the increase
in mental disease in the colored population as compared with the white’
(p. 310), while W. M. Bevis’s 1921 ‘Psychological traits of the Southern
Negro’ worked to maintain insanity’s colour line. Certainly, the question we
now must ask is how this particular version of national identity – this modern,
American neurotic subjectivity so powerfully articulated and popularized by
Beard and reinforced by the discourse of insanity – continued to evolve in
the early twentieth century. More specifi cally, future research should focus
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on the reactions of those to whom this identity was so strenuously denied;
how did they acknowledge and respond to it, resist or accept it, negotiate
or appropriate it? We must, in other words, ask how mental illnesses of all
kinds and degrees continued to shape the meaning of ‘American’.
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Notes
1.
2.

3.

4.

Here and throughout this paper, ‘America’ refers specifi cally to the USA.
The history of ‘neurasthenia’ is even more tangled than most scholars of the disease
suggest. After claiming it as his own in 1869, Beard was scolded by the American Journal of
Insanity for overlooking E. H. Van Deusen’s introduction of the term in 1867 (see Sukov,
1971). Seventy years later, historian Henry Alden Bunker found an even earlier use of the
term in an 1856 medical lexicon (Bunker, 1944). Most scholars accept Bunker’s word
as final (see, e.g., MacMillan, 1976; Rosenberg, 1962; Sicherman, 1977; Sukov, 1971;
Wiener, 1956), but my own research suggests an even earlier origin, in the 1833 edition
of Dunglison’s Medical Dictionary – a point first suggested by Margaret Cleaves (1886:
164) in her study of neurasthenia in women.
I say ‘primarily’ because, while Beard certainly recognized the potential for and occurrence
of neurasthenia in women, he nonetheless, like most other neurologists of his time, considered men ‘peculiarly liable’ to the disease because of the particular kind of labour
or ‘brain work’ they performed (see also, for instance: Collins and Phillips, 1899: 413;
Jewell, 1881: 22). Freud also considered neurasthenia to be more prevalent in men, though
for different reasons: for him, it was a function of their greater penchant for masturbation
(MacMillan, 1976: 383). The gender of neurasthenia is something scholars continue to
debate; see: Briggs, 2000: 247; Gijswijt-Hofstra and Porter, 2001: 23; Gosling, 1987: 34.
As Beard and others suggested, insanity could be a ‘sequence’ or final effect of neurasthenia
(see: Beard, 1881: 16, 59; Cowles, 1891: 8, 54).
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